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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent times, the occurrence of loss of offsite power
(LOOP) events in nuclear power plants (NPPs) has increased,
due to human error and/or component failures during the
maintenance of the electric power equipment. These LOOPs
have resulted primarily from combined causes of inadequate
work management and human error. However, a program
to prevent LOOPs through the well-prepared, systematic
management of maintenance and other tasks for NPPs,
including surveillance tests and outage maintenance, has
not yet been developed. After recognizing this issue, Korea
Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. (KHNP) initiated the devel-
opment of a loss of voltage (LOV) monitor as a part of the
NPP safety enhancement plan. Although there is a verified
risk monitor, the outage risk indicator of NPPs (ORION),
which evaluates outage risk, the LOV monitor is the first
program to prevent LOOPs, because ORION cannot express
an LOV condition as a warning.
2. DESCRIPTION OF NEW PROGRAM
2.1 LOOP Operating Events
KHNP reported a total of 19 LOOP events to the regula-
tory organization, including a partial loss of the safety
bus [1]. Ten of these events occurred from 2009 to 2012.
LOOP events due to severe weather, such as thunderstorms,
lightening, and strong winds were excluded in identifying
the root causes because these are not controllable through
human efforts. Thirteen events (68%) among the total of
19 events resulted from human-related errors. Only four
events (21%) are related to the hardware failure such as
component failure, foreign materials, and aging (see Fig. 1).
The root cause analysis was conducted again after the
domestic LOOP events were combined with those from
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Fig. 1. Loss of Offsite Power Experiences in Korea
the USA [2]. The results presented similarities in that a
significant cause of LOOP events was created by human
error, not by component failures (see Fig. 2).
2.2 Program Development Process
A starting point for preventing LOOPs is to control
the loss of voltage (LOV)-initiating components. The
LOV-initiating components are defined as those that can
cause a loss of power in one or more trains. A low voltage
relay for an LOV signal is actuated when the safety bus
power is not provided by the preferred power supply (PPS).
When an LOV signal is initiated, the circuit breakers for
the normal and alternative power sources are opened and
the emergency diesel generator (EDG) is started. If both
EDGs and the final alternative AC diesel fail, a station
blackout (SBO) will occur.
In the first development stage, design documents such
as the system description, single line diagrams, and control
logic drawings were reviewed in order to prepare a func-
tional block diagram and identify the LOV-related compo-
nents. After identifying these components in the system, the
failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) was implemented;
based on this, the fault tree analysis was conducted. Finally,
the LOV monitor software was developed and a fault tree
model was interfaced with the software for the LOV risk
assessment during an outage. Figure 3 presents a schematic
of the analysis process for the development of the LOV
monitor system. It generally followed methods to monitor
NPP risk from transmission grid conditions [3] and analyzed
single point vulnerabilities in the switchyard [5].
The LOV monitor software, which monitors the LOV
status, provides a systematic tool for implementing work
management related to the LOV during an outage. This
tool is interfaced with the enterprise resource planning
(ERP) database, outage management system (scheduling
program), and a plant information (PI) server for users to
analyze the LOV risk online. Figure 4 presents an overview
of the development of the LOV monitor software.
KHNP is creating a list of LOV-initiating components,
improving their reliability, and evaluating and monitoring
the maintenance required to maximize plant safety. In order
to achieve this, all replaceable subcomponents in the LOV
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Fig. 3. Process for Analysis of the LOV Monitor System
Fig. 2. Loss of Offsite Power Experiences in Korea and the USA Fig. 4. Development of LOV Monitor Software
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system must be considered when the LOV-initiating compo-
nents are selected using the failure mode and effect analysis
(FMEA). The NPPs of KHNP maintain detailed lists of
the special components that could cause LOVs or LOOPs
based on their design characteristics. Furthermore, special
marks are attached to these LOV-initiating components
in the field, and all work orders for these components are
specially treated by the reinforced pre-job briefings. These
efforts, and systems such as the LOV monitor, focus the
current NPP activities on the switchyard and power block,
and support operators in controlling the plant maintenance
in order to enhance the safety of nuclear power plants.
2.3 Risk Assessment
Because an automatic system that can provide messages
and alerts during the approval of work orders does not yet
exist, it is difficult to manage and control, without delays,
the work conditions of the components that could cause a
loss of voltage. This leads to inadequate operator recognition
of the changes in the system operating conditions during
maintenance. For example, field components could be
abruptly actuated by the unexpected isolation of components,
incorrect arrangement, or incorrect manipulation, due to
a lack of knowledge and/or human error. In addition, the
time window of work orders for some components is not
identical to the precise working time needed. 
After the development of the LOV monitor is completed,
a supervisory system for the maintenance of the LOV
components during outages will be established. Therefore,
in the plant, the component states (primarily circuit breakers)
related to the offsite power are monitored through the PI
system. In addition, work orders are interfaced with the
outage schedule management system, and they are collected
and evaluated automatically from the ERP database. The
operators assess whether the current work order could
cause an LOV or not, if it is conducted through the use of
an LOV monitor function for a one-click evaluation. The
concept of the LOV risk monitoring system is presented
in Fig. 5. Green means that both offsite power sources
are provided. Yellow indicates that one train of offsite
power is under maintenance. Orange (warning) means
that one train of offsite power is under maintenance and a
work order for the other train is issued within the same
time window. Red (LOV) means that an operator pushed
a monitor evaluation button and confirmed that an actual
LOV will occur if he permits the work order.
The fault tree presented in Fig. 6 indicates one case
among the thousands of failure or out of service combina-
tions that can result in an LOV. If a non-1E 4.16 kV power
bus is energized and has a fault (e.g. an unblocked work
order due to human error) when non-1E 125 VDC power
(NB) bus maintenance is in progress, this bus fault is
propagated to the start-up transformer, which leads to the
opening of the switchyard circuit breaker, which results
in an LOV on the safeguard bus.
This fault propagation occurs because the related circuit
breaker (NB S02-03) cannot be opened due to a lack of
control power to isolate the bus fault.
Fig. 5. Concept of LOV Risk Monitoring
3. CONCLUSIONS
3.1 Applications
KHNP is developing an online risk assessment program
(LOV monitor) that focuses on a loss of voltage on the
safeguard bus. This new program can support maintaining
plant safety by preventing the loss of offsite power that can
be initiated from the LOV condition. In addition, outage
schedule delays resulting from the LOV event are prevented.
In terms of technical benefits, the loss of voltage or loss
of offsite power caused by human error and inadequate
work management can be prevented, because operators
can evaluate the LOV-related risk more easily within the
limited time before permitting the work order in progress.
This program may be called integrated online supervisory
software, because it is interfaced with both the PI system
and the ERP database containing all outage work orders.
This program will be applied in the priority determination
of plant preventive maintenance, design improvements,
and optimization of equipment operation, because the
vulnerabilities that can cause the loss of voltage can be
evaluated quantitatively.
3.2 Achievements and Conclusion
Because the LOV monitor raises the alarm about the
power loss of one train of the safety bus before the power
loss of the other train occurs, a loss of offsite power (LOOP)
due to inadequate work management during an outage can
be prevented. Seven events, which were related to the
human error, inadequate work plan, work management,
and system configuration management, among a total of
13 LOOP events (including partial loss cases) in domestic
NPPs could be avoided by using the LOV monitor. Approxi-
mately 50% of loss of offsite power events, based on histor-
ical data, may be prevented in the future using this LOV
monitor. Therefore, for safety improvements of plant opera-
tion and maintenance, the work management reinforcement
through the development and operation of an LOV monitor
may be a more cost-effective method than massive design
changes or system improvements.
When the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model
of the domestic plant that experienced the station blackout
in 2012 was used for the safety analysis of this LOV preven-
tion program, it was evaluated that approximately 27%
of core damage frequency would have been reduced with
a decreased LOOP initiating event frequency. This frequency
reduction is calculated by the assumption that one train
loss of the safety bus (partial loss case) is regarded as a
LOOP event.
In conclusion, the establishment of the maintenance
program including the operation of an LOV monitor for the
offsite power system is expected to contribute to strengthen-
ing risk management and safety culture, as well as preven-
ting unexpected loss of offsite power events in nuclear
power plants.
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Fig. 6. Fault Tree Logic for the LOV Monitor
